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The coalition · founder-controller — Zalupski 64.07% economic (≥50% threshold; controlled-issuer applies) dynamic + institutional thresholds

A founder-controller — Zalupski 64.07% economic (≥50% threshold; controlled-issuer applies) and the Texas threshold math.

Bottom line. Dream Finders Homes's ownership structure is unusual in the SB-29-era-mover cohort: Elon Musk holds 64.07% economically and approximately 22% of voting power. Dream Finders Homes is not a "controlled company" under NASDAQ Rule 5615(c) or under Texas SB 21's controlled-issuer definition, but the founder-controller — Zalupski 64.07% economic (≥50% threshold; controlled-issuer applies) character is central to the post-SB-29 governance narrative. For Texas's elective opt-in thresholds (§21.552(a)(3) 3% derivative standing; §21.373 $1M shareholder-proposal threshold), the institutional-coalition arithmetic is reported below — pending the 13F-family ownership snapshot for Dream Finders Homes as of the canonical pre-event date.

The founder-controller — Zalupski 64.07% economic (≥50% threshold; controlled-issuer applies) dynamic

Ownership snapshot (S&P Capital IQ as of 2026-04-25)

  • Patrick O. Zalupski — largest individual holder: 64.07% economic stake; approximately 22% of voting power. Controller type: founder / CEO.
  • Insiders aggregate: 24.95% (Dream Finders Homes's filings disclose Musk and other officers/directors aggregated).
  • ≥5% individual holder list: Patrick O. Zalupski (64.07%).
  • Is Dream Finders Homes a "controlled company"? No — Musk's voting stake falls below the 50% threshold under NASDAQ Rule 5615(c) and Texas SB 21's controlled-issuer definition. The firm is founder-led with a controller-adjacent power structure that the post-SB-29 narrative treats as load-bearing.

The founder-controller — Zalupski 64.07% economic (≥50% threshold; controlled-issuer applies) dynamic creates a power asymmetry standard event-study identification doesn't directly model: the marginal trader does not fully set price when a founder-controller — Zalupski 64.07% economic (≥50% threshold; controlled-issuer applies) could credibly deliver a discontinuous corporate action (e.g., another redomiciliation, a take-private, a special dividend). The /stress_tests page documents how this asymmetry interacts with the Day-0 abnormal-return tests.

The institutional coalition — pending 13F snapshot

Pending verification — 13F-family ownership snapshot for Dream Finders Homes

The coalition arithmetic below requires the canonical 13F-family ownership snapshot (S&P Capital IQ Public Ownership Detailed) as of Dream Finders Homes's pre-event date. Pending that snapshot, the standard fields are shown with [DATA PENDING] placeholders.

Measure Dream Finders Homes value
Total 13F-family filers in the universe[DATA PENDING]
Filers individually exceeding the §21.373 $1M threshold[DATA PENDING]
Two-holder combinations clearing the §21.552(a)(3) 3% derivative threshold[DATA PENDING]
Vanguard + BlackRock + State Street combined %[DATA PENDING]
Position-date breakdown[DATA PENDING]
Controller stake (Musk)64.07% (founder-CEO)

The "do thresholds matter for Dream Finders Homes?" question

Two conditions independently matter: (1) has Dream Finders Homes opted into SB 29 / SB 1057 thresholds (see /statutes)? (2) If Dream Finders Homes has opted in, can the institutional coalition clear the thresholds? Both conditions resolve before the coalition-arithmetic argument carries weight. In the cross-firm cohort, the XOM canonical demonstrates the pattern: even where a firm opts into the 3% derivative threshold, the existing institutional shareholder base can clear it via two-holder coalitions. Dream Finders Homes's coalition math will follow the same procedure once the 13F snapshot is pulled.

The founder-controller — Zalupski 64.07% economic (≥50% threshold; controlled-issuer applies) dynamic complicates the coalition analysis in a way that XOM's diffuse-shareholder profile did not: Musk's ~[DATA PENDING — voting %] voting power is not a coalition member; it is a counterweight to coalitions. The cross-firm placebo on /evidence reports how Dream Finders Homes ranks among the 21-firm placebo distribution; the comparator is informative even before the per-firm event-study runs.

Primary sources

Ownership data

Full Bluebook-format citations in SOURCES.md.