The Trade Desk, Inc. (TTD) — Reincorporation detail

Announcement

2024-10-03

First SEC disclosure

Meeting / Vote

2024-11-14

COMPLETED

Effective

2024-11-15

Legal effective date

Market Cap

$9.1B

At announcement

Why this firm matters

Standard cohort firm (Completed). Included for breadth across destinations and sectors.

Controller & ownership

Diffuse / non-controlledFounder Significant Minority

Jeffrey Green (CEO/Founder, via Class B 10:1 supervoting — sub-50%) holds approximately 48.4% of voting power. No single holder reaches the controlled-company threshold (>50% of voting power).

Source: TTD 2025 DEF 14A (Sept 16, 2025 special meeting, accession 0001193125-25-164411, p.24) — Jeff T. Green beneficially owns 4,754,752 Class A shares + 42,239,186 Class B shares (97.6% of Class B, NOT 100%); 446,622,494 Class A + 43,275,936 Class B outstanding; Class B carries 10 votes/share; combined voting power 427,146,612 / 879,381,854 = 48.4%. Founder/CEO/Chairman but sub-50% — NOT a controlled company under NYSE Rule 303A.00. Tracker's prior 49.2% figure baked an incorrect assumption that Green held 100% of Class B; actual is 97.6%. Corrected 2026-05-19 via Tier-3 overnight reviewer dispatch + Tier-2 primary-source verification (also flipped controlled flag 1→0 to match strict listing-rule definition; pending rev66 schema split for founder-dominant-sub-50% bucket).

Vote outcome — reincorporation proposal

Approval standard: majority of the voting power of the outstanding stock entitled to vote (DGCL §266 conversion). Meeting type: annual.

Vote totals not yet pulled. Awaiting EDGAR Item 5.07.

Event-study abnormal returns — announcement window

Returns around the announcement date.

Event date: 2024-09-20 · Estimation window: 2023-10-06 to 2024-09-19 (240 days)

Specification	Day-0 AR	Inference
Synthetic control (9-donor Information Technology peer pool)i	+0.27%	no inference
Market model (SPY benchmark)i	-0.23%	Patell-z p-value = 0.932
Sector-augmented model (SPY + Nasdaq-100 (QQQ)) HEADLINEi	-0.27%	Patell-z p-value = 0.919
Matched pair (vs EA, market-model-adjusted)i	+0.49%	two-sided p-value = 0.864
Raw differential vs EAi	+0.27%	no inference

Robustness checks — does the headline result hold up?

Three independent diagnostics that interrogate the headline estimate from different angles. All three pointing the same way = high confidence in the result.

Pre-event drift check: the firm's daily abnormal return drifted by +0.0021% per day in the pre-event window (p = 0.467). no detectable pre-event drift âœ“. — A near-zero slope means the pre-event period was stable, so the day-0 reaction is not contamination from a pre-existing trend.
Donor co-movement check: 7 of 9 peer firms moved in the same direction as the treated firm on the event day (binomial p = 0.1797). — A high concordance means the day was driven by industry-wide news rather than something firm-specific. A low concordance means the firm moved differently from peers (potential firm-specific signal).
Synthetic-control fit quality: pre-event correlation between the firm and its synthetic twin = 0.601 (modest tracking); RÂ² = -1.524 (fraction of pre-event variance explained); Durbin-Watson = 2.05 (no autocorrelation). — Higher correlation + higher RÂ² + Durbin-Watson near 2 means the synthetic peer was a good match before the event, so the post-event gap is interpretable.

Event-study abnormal returns — vote window

Returns around the shareholder-vote (or written-consent) date.

Event date: 2024-11-14 · T0 source: actual_effective_date_iso · Estimation window: trailing 240 days; 240 valid after NaN drop

Specification	Day-0 AR	Inference
Market model (SPY benchmark) HEADLINEi	-0.11%	Patell-z p-value = 0.961

Long-run abnormal returns & pooled estimates

Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (1 / 3 / 6 / 12 months) and calendar-time portfolio alpha (CTE) post-effective.

Effective date: 2024-11-14 · n_post = 363 days

Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR)

Horizon & benchmark	BHAR	Inference
1 month vs S&P 500	+3.11%	Patell-z = +0.22 · p = 0.829 · n = 21 days
1 month vs sector ETF (XLK)	+2.43%	Patell-z = +0.22 · p = 0.829 · n = 21 days
3 months vs S&P 500	-42.68% ^***	Patell-z = -2.53 · p = 0.011 · n = 63 days
3 months vs sector ETF (XLK)	-42.46% ^***	Patell-z = -2.53 · p = 0.011 · n = 63 days
6 months vs S&P 500	-39.34%	Patell-z = -1.49 · p = 0.135 · n = 126 days
6 months vs sector ETF (XLK)	-38.75%	Patell-z = -1.49 · p = 0.135 · n = 126 days
12 months vs S&P 500	-80.45% ^***	Patell-z = -2.92 · p = 0.004 · n = 252 days
12 months vs sector ETF (XLK)	-87.58% ^***	Patell-z = -2.92 · p = 0.004 · n = 252 days

Calendar-time portfolio alpha (CTE)

Specification	Annualized alpha	Inference
Calendar-time portfolio alpha vs S&P 500	-74.52%/yr ^***	t = -2.29 · p = 0.022 · n = 363 days · Newey-West HAC SE (lag=5)
Calendar-time portfolio alpha vs sector ETF	-74.59%/yr ^***	t = -2.32 · p = 0.020 · n = 363 days · Newey-West HAC SE (lag=5)

Cohort-level robustness battery

Heckman selection-corrected ATE · Romano-Wolf step-down + BH FDR · pooled BHAR. This firm's reading is shown in context of the full cohort.

Heckman two-step selection correction (controlled-vs-widely-held)

Cohort ATE = +0.94% (SE = 7.06%, n = 2395) after correcting for controller-status selection (inverse Mills ratio = -0.062).

Romano-Wolf step-down + Benjamini-Hochberg FDR (n = 47)

This firm: raw p = 0.919, Romano-Wolf adjusted p = 1.000, BH-FDR adjusted p = 0.966. Multiple-hypothesis correction is computed across the full cohort to control family-wise error rate at alpha = 0.05.

Pooled cohort BHAR (mover firms only)

BHAR_63d: mean = -5.60% (SE = 22.11%, n = 3, p = 0.499) · BHAR_126d: mean = +17.33% (SE = 41.17%, n = 3, p = 0.774)

See Cohort event study → for the full battery and forest plots.

Nevada Statutory Disclosures

Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) governance provisions relevant to Delaware→Nevada redomestications. Five sections summarized; each links to the Nevada Legislature’s authoritative NRS text. Counterpart to the Texas § 21.552 / § 21.373 panel for TX-destination firms.

NRS § 78.138 — Director / officer fiduciary duty

Codifies the business-judgment rule and limits monetary liability of directors and officers absent breach of loyalty, intentional misconduct, fraud, or knowing violation of law. Stronger statutory shield than DGCL § 102(b)(7) on its face; charter opt-out / carve-out is firm-specific.

PENDING VERIFICATION

Adoption with carve-out by The Trade Desk, Inc.: primary-source verification pending; canonical record not yet populated.

NRS § 78.7502 — Indemnification of directors / officers

Broad permissive indemnification statute; covers expenses, judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement for any action by reason of service as director or officer, subject to good-faith standard. Charter / bylaw uptake is firm-specific.

PENDING VERIFICATION

The Trade Desk, Inc. indemnification provisions pending charter / bylaw extraction.

NRS §§ 78.378–3793 — Acquisition of controlling interest

Nevada's control-share acquisition statute (anti-takeover): voting rights of shares acquired in a “control-share acquisition” are extinguished absent disinterested-shareholder approval. Opt-out is by charter or bylaw amendment; default is opt-in for Nevada corporations meeting the statute's coverage thresholds.

PENDING VERIFICATION

The Trade Desk, Inc. opt-in / opt-out status pending charter or bylaw verification.

NRS §§ 78.411–444 — Combinations with interested stockholders

Nevada's business-combination statute (anti-takeover): for two years post-acquisition, a Nevada corporation may not engage in a “combination” with a 10%+ interested stockholder unless the board pre-approved the transaction. Charter opt-out available.

PENDING VERIFICATION

The Trade Desk, Inc. opt-in / opt-out status pending charter verification.

NRS § 92A.135 — Conversion mechanism (DGCL § 266 analog)

Authorizes conversion of a foreign business entity into a Nevada domestic entity by filing articles of conversion. The Nevada analog to DGCL § 266 (Delaware) and TBOC §§ 10.101–108 (Texas). Where used, the firm's redomestication is a true legal-entity conversion rather than a reverse-triangular merger.

PENDING VERIFICATION

Mechanism (§ 92A.135 conversion vs. merger-with-NV-sub) pending primary-source verification.

Primary-source pending. Where badges read “PENDING VERIFICATION,” the firm-specific adoption posture (e.g., charter carve-outs to NRS § 78.138, opt-outs from NRS §§ 78.378–3793 or 78.411–444) has not yet been extracted from the firm’s amended-and-restated articles or proxy materials. The presence of a Nevada incorporation alone does not establish adoption of every provision; opt-outs are charter-level facts.

Source filings

Primary-source documents on SEC EDGAR plus IR / search links.

IR — https://investors.thetradedesk.com/
EDGAR — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001671933&type=&dateb=&owner=include&count=40
Proxy — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001671933&type=DEF+14A&dateb=&owner=include&count=40
8-K Item 5.07 (vote) · 0001193125-24-260382 — filing →
First SEC disclosure · 0001193125-24-231685 — filing →
Note. DEF 14A Oct 3, 2024 (special meeting Nov 14, 2024; DE->NV)

Classification & audit trail

Bucket

Panel eligibility

PRE_SB29_BENCHMARK

Audit status

NEEDS_ACCESSION | PATCHED_v6-rev77_2026-05-24_wave1b_audit_fixes: per firm_roster_audit_2026-05-24.md + batch summaries

Source confidence

VERIFIED_EFFECTIVE

Transaction status

COMPLETED

Audit notes

[2026-04-28] Phase 4I: replaced Google-search IR fallback with direct URL https://investors.thetradedesk.com/
[2026-04-28] Phase 4K: corrected vote date (was 2024-09-26, actually 2024-11-14 Special Meeting). Trade Desk Delaware Chancery refused to require supermajority — second-most-cited legal precedent after Palkon v. Maffei. is_legal_precedent=1; treat with heavy annotation.
[2026-04-28] Phase 4N: synthesized event_study_announcement_json from existing scalar CAR cells (phase4a_v2 join). Reviewer can extend with multi-spec analysis. [2026-04-28] phase5c: vote source 8-K 0001193125-24-260382 (2024-11-18, Δ=4d) applied from EDGAR pull (status=AUTO_RESOLVED) [ORIGINAL_ACCESSION_FIELD_TEXT] DEF 14A Oct 3, 2024 (special meeting Nov 14, 2024; DE->NV) [2026-04-28] phase5e: no canonical accession found in raw value 'DEF 14A Oct 3, 2024 (special meeting Nov 14, 2024; DE->NV)'; original narrative moved to audit_notes; edgar_accession_canonical cleared and audit_status flagged NEEDS_ACCESSION for manual EDGAR pull [2026-04-28] phase5c: vote source 8-K 0001193125-24-260382 (2024-11-18, Δ=4d) applied from EDGAR pull (status=AUTO_RESOLVED) [2026-04-29] phase5r: bucket 'B1' -> 'A' (DE->NV effective 2024-11-14 < SB29 (2025-05-14) -> bucket A (pre-SB29)) [2026-04-29] phase5w: comprehensive validation by external reviewer across tranches v4 (4-version full residual walk, 269 substantive answers across 52 firms, 0 bucket drifts vs v3.58)
[2026-04-29] v3.75: VERIFIED — DGCL §266 conversion mechanism. Per Dechert/Fried Frank/Harvard Forum: Gunderson v. Trade Desk (Del. Ch. Nov 2024) RULED that the charter's supermajority amendment threshold was INAPPLICABLE to Nevada conversion under §266; only DGCL-statutory majority-of-outstanding-voting-power was required. Special meeting Nov 14, 2024.
v3.84-rev2 MODERATE date correction: announcement_date_iso changed from 2024-09-20 to 2024-10-03. The September 2024 date was the board approval / press-release date, not the first SEC-filed disclosure. The DEF 14A filing on October 3, 2024 is the canonical first-SEC-disclosure date per protocol. PRE 14A verification still pending; correct to October 3 unless an earlier qualifying filing is found.
v3.84-rev5 [2026-04-30] cell-audit reconciliation verified: DEF 14A filing date (first proxy disclosure) (source_type=DEF14A, quality=HIGH).